SAFEXPLAIN

Safe and Explainable
Critical Embedded Systems based on AI

A Tale of Machine Learning Process Models

ASPICE Machine Learning Engineering (MLE) *vs* SAFEXPLAIN AI Functional Safety Management (AI-FSM)

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SAFEXPLAIN (HORIZON project) already presented at SPIN 2023

- The scene
  - **Critical Embedded Systems (CES)** increasingly rely on Artificial Intelligence (AI): automotive, space, railway, avionics, etc.
  - CES must undergo **certification/qualification**
  - AI apparently at odds with traditional functional safety **certification/qualification** processes and methods (such as those of ISO 61508, ISO 26262, SOTIF, etc.)
- SAFEXPLAIN ambition: architecting DL solutions **enabling certification/qualification**
  - Making them **explainable and traceable** and **adhere to "safety culture"** through extension of traditional process lifecycle
  - Preserving **high performance**
  - Tailoring solutions to **varying safety requirements**

OCT 2022 – SEP 2025

SAFEXPLAIN

Safe and Explainable Critical Embedded Systems based on AI

BARCELONA SUPERCOMPUTING CENTER (BSC)
https://www.bsc.es/

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AIKO SRL (AIKO)
https://www.aikospace.com/

RISE RESEARCH INSTITUTES OF SWEDEN AB (RISE)
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NAVINFO EUROPE BV (NAV)
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EXIDA DEVELOPMENT SRL (EXI)
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SAFEXPLAIN HAS 5 STATED GOALS…

- At ***SPIN Italia 2023***, presentation was on an early result of **Goal 2**: *Adapt (software) safety lifecycle steps and the architecture of solutions based on DL components so that certification is viable,* that is to say*:*
  - *…*
  - *V&V model (based on SOTIF, developed by exida, reviewed by IKERLAN)*
  - *…*
- At ***SPIN Italia 2024***, presentation is on another consolidated results of **Goal 2,** , that is to say*:*
  - *…*
  - *AI-FSM model (based on IEC 61508, developed by IKERLAN, reviewed by TUV and exida)*
  - *…*

Safety-related Development Processes

- ISO 26262 software V-model



Logic behind certification/qualification



Safety-related Systems Development Process

- AI-related challenges



DATA DETERMINES SYSTEM DESIGN

Logic behind AI software design



Ambition/objective for SAFEXPLAIN Goal 2

- Re-think safety lifecycle
  - **Keep principles** but with AI implementation in mind
  - Enable the **use of some AI models** first, and generate requirements, goals, unit testing, etc. from there (**bottom-up approach instead of top-down**)
  - Specific steps to **manage data, learning** and **inference**



Stated Goal 2/5 of SAFEXPLAIN is explicitly about:

- Adapt software safety lifecycle steps and the architecture of solutions based on DL components so that certification is viable
  - E.g., add additional lifecycle steps to contemplate model training, and adapt requirement specification, data management and testing approaches



Tailor safety life cycle to enable DNN certification

Tailor DNNs to match properties needed by functional safety standards

SAFEXPLAIN approach has been inspired by guidelines, papers and models from aerospace and automotive domain

Comparable life-cycle/process models

- **SAFEXPLAIN** approach to the SW development life-cycle (when ML/DL components are integrated in the overall SW architecture) has been initially inspired by guidelines (*EASA Concept Paper: guidance for Level 1 & 2 machine learning applications*) and papers (*Proposing the Use of Hazard Analysis for Machine Learning Data Sets*) from influential aerospace (**EASA** - European Union Aviation Safety Agency and **DEVCOM** - U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Aviation & Missile Center) stakeholders.
- Thanks to an agreement with the **AK13 of VDA**, an exchange of pre-publication drafts took place in early 2023, allowing **SAFEXPLAIN** to become acquainted with the **MLE Model** now integrated in the recently published draft of the **ASPICE 4.0**.
- The rest of this presentation will focus on the striking similarities of all these approaches in terms of **ML/DL processes** identification and description, despite some significant differences mostly in terms of terminology.

Origin of the (A)SPICE ML Model

- Originally developed according to the “Plug-in” concept as the Hardware model by a dedicated Working Group
- It started later than other plugins (MECH, HWE) but as ML is affecting many aspects of automotive development it was given a special priority for integration in the full ASPICE 4.0
- Here an early public presentation of the key ML activities…



Origin of the (A)SPICE ML Model

- …and the original idea of "positioning" the **4 new MLE processes** as a distinct "mini-V" taking place of the "tip of the V" in the traditional SWE V-model

- A distinct process belonging to a different process group was created to be in charge of ML **Data Set Management**



Current status of (A)SPICE MLE - integrated in ASPICE PAM 4.0 (I)

- The previous schemes have been further elaborated and finally included into **ASPICE 4.0, Annex C.3 "Integration of Machine Learning Engineering Processes"**, where, expectedly, special relevance is given to the concept of **ML architecture**…



Figure C.3 — Integration of MLE Processes



Figure C.4 — Interdependencies within MLE and SUP.11

Current status of (A)SPICE MLE - integrated in ASPICE PAM 4.0 (II)

- …with even a specific **example of ML architecture**
- *"ML architecture typically consists of an **ML model and other ML architectural elements**, which are other (classical) software components […] and provided **to train, test, and deploy the ML model.**"*



Figure C.5 — Example of an ML Architecture

ASPICE MLE Processes and ‘characterizing’ Information Items

MLE.1 Machine Learning Requirements Analysis

- *(no specific II, but specific* ML requirements *are expected)*

MLE.2 Machine Learning Architecture

- 04-51 ML architecture (includes *01-54 Hyperparameters*)
- 01-54 Hyperparameters

MLE.3 Machine Learning Training

- 08-65 ML training and validation approach (a.k.a. *strategy*)
- 03-51 ML data set
- 01-53 Trained ML model

MLE.4 Machine Learning Model Testing

- 08-64 ML test approach (a.k.a. *strategy*)
- 03-51 ML data set
- 11-50 Deployed ML model
- 13-50 ML test results

SUP.11 Machine Learning Data Management

- 19-50 ML data quality approach (a.k.a. *strategy*)
- 16-52 ML data management system (part of CM system)
- 03-53 ML data (all ML-related data, includes *03-51 ML data set*)

Interlude I - EASA Concept Paper: guidance for ML (Feb 2023)



Global view of learning assurance **W-shaped** process, non-AI/ML constituent **V-cycle** process

Interlude II – DEVCOM Paper: ML Data Sets Lifecycle (Summer 2023)



ML Data Governance Process within the overall ML Development Lifecycle

Back to SAFEXPLAIN: AI-FSM as extension of FuSa lifecycle



Initial comparison ASPICE / SAFEXPLAIN ML models (I)

SUP.11 *vs* PhDM Data Management

Mapping is quite straightforward between *Practices and IIs* on one side and *Activities and outcomes* on the other

MLE.1 *vs* DL Requirements specifications

Mapping makes clear that all DL requirements are a subset/derived from SW requirements and that Ph2 DL Architecture specifications are there to satisfy those requirements

MLE.2 *vs* Ph2 DL Architecture specifications

Mapping makes clear that all Ph2 DL Architecture specifications are actually design (part of the overall SW architecture), and that needed complementary traditional architectural design descriptions (elements, interfaces…) are expected to be defined

Initial comparison ASPICE / SAFEXPLAIN ML models (II)

MLE.3 *vs* PhLM Learning Management

The “learning requirements specifications” appears to be mappable with the “training and verification/validation approach” and “ML data set”; Trained Model is a common basic outcome

MLE.4 *vs* PhIM Inference Management

The “inference requirements specifications” appears to be mappable with the “ML test approach” and “ML data set”; Deployed Model (i.e., Tested, Re-verified) is a common basic outcome
It is unclear the reason for the major difference in the naming (i.e. “Model Testing” vs “Inference”); please note that in early ASPICE MLE draft MLE.4 is called “ML Model Evaluation”

Some Preliminary Conclusions

- It appears there are no significant gaps in the **SAFEXPLAIN AI-FSM model** to become compliant to the **ASPICE MLE model**; **SAFEXPLAIN consortium** on one side and **VDA-QMS and Intacs** on the other side have expressed strong interest in collaborating towards further alignment
- A big advantage in adopting both approaches is that **SAFEXPLAIN AI-FSM model** (like EASA's guidelines and other draft standards dedicated to "Safe AI") are already incorporating FuSa aspects while the **ASPICE MLE Model** is "pure QM", thereby allowing a process "discipline decomposition", that has proved quite effective with ASPICE and ISO 26262 in the last decade
- By distinguishing "from the start" **Process Quality** aspects from **Functional Safety** aspects of ML/DL applications, a paradigm can be established to be further extended to **Cybersecurity**, too, addressing the most critical pillars of **Trustworthy AI**, according to both of the most important pieces of AI regulation already in place, the **EU AI Act** and the **US President Executive Order** on the **Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence**

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