

Automotive Spin Italia:2025

A Modular Fuzzer for CAN Network Security


Cybersecurity is a top priority in the modern era

- Modern cars are vulnerable to cyberattacks (easily found via a quick Google search)
- **ISO 21434** sets the standard for managing automotive cyber threats.
- There's a growing need for automated tools to detect these vulnerabilities



Challenges in Developing Tools

- **Variety in vehicle types:** each manufacturer uses different components and coding systems
- **Variety in attack types:** vehicle theft, remote control while driving, data theft
- **Variety in attack vectors:** Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, smart devices, Vehicle-to-Vehicle, Vehicle-to-Everything.



Fuzzy Testing






Objectives and Methodology


Fuzzing Testing

- Automated testing using random or crafted inputs to find crashes, errors and unexpected behaviour
- Supports black-box and white-box approaches
- Covers diverse input scenarios with effective test cases
- Enables early detection of software flaws



The CAN Protocol


- Central Nervous System of a car, connecting all ECUs
- Serial, message-based, asynchronous and broadcast Nature






CAN Bus Vulnerabilities

- CAN bus lacks encryption, allowing attackers to easily eavesdrop on vehicle data.
- Spoofing messages to control car functions may compromise vehicle safety.
- CAN protocol violates core **CIA** security principles




Real World example: Keyless Car Theft

- CAN frames can be injected to unlock the doors and start the engine
- Bypass security features of Smart Key due to the CAN network structure (**Key fob/RF/NFC**)
- BMW X6 M




120k BMW X6 M
stolen within 30
seconds with a
relay attack.

05 November 2023



Working Flow of Software Modules






Virtual CAN BUS Attack

- **Safe Simulation:** Software-based CAN bus for testing without hardware
- **Real-World Use:** Supports fuzzing and ECU vulnerability testing
- **Python-Based:** Uses python-can for custom message injection
- **Cost-Effective:** Flexible, risk-free testing across scenarios

	timestamp	: arbitrationId	: isExtendedId	: isCanFD	: DLC	: data	: isErrorFrame	: direction	:
1	1719743131.8148532	0x68	False	False	8	a95c7b41a7690fda	False	SENT	
2	1719743131.82507	0x79	False	False	5	708cbf024a	False	SENT	
3	1719743131.8352501	0x68	False	False	4	e9a299a5	False	SENT	
4	1719743131.8454497	0x75	False	False	4	261aaab5	False	SENT	
5	1719743131.8556368	0x75	False	False	0	<null>	False	SENT	
6	1719743131.8657823	0x75	False	False	8	b58a8f7da8067f18	False	SENT	
7	1719743131.875964	0x68	False	False	6	844976c20915	False	SENT	

Real Environment



- Implementing a fuzzer attack on a generic city car
- Targeting vulnerabilities in the car's systems
- Goal to disrupt the car's ECU system



Scenario of a Generic City Car

Reaction of Infotainment System

- During the attack, all display icons blinked, with a prominent red "Motor Failure" message showing error code 0184.



VCU(motor Failure)

- Reverse engineering revealed the CAN ID causing the motor failure warning.
- It can trigger power steering lock and loss of other functions.

	timestamp	arbitrationId	isExtendedId	isCanFD	DLC	data	isErrorFrame	direction
1	16058395759	0x411	False	False	8	c40fde04e08a9700	False	RECV
2	16058405367	0x415	False	False	8	1027ee0db47f0790	False	RECV
3	16058498657	0x605	False	False	8	0000010000000000	False	RECV
4	16058508440	0x151	False	False	8	c401000000000000	False	RECV
5	16058518046	0x152	False	False	8	4100000000f5451f	False	RECV
6	16058562619	0x150	False	False	8	4000000000000000	False	RECV

CAN Fuzzer

CAN Interface Selector

Value CAN

Socket CAN

Device Index

0

Baudrate Net 1

500000

Baudrate Net 2

500000

CAN Fuzzer

Random

Sequential

BLF Replay

☐ Force Extended ID
 ☐ CAN FD

Min ID (Hex)

0

Max ID (Hex)

7FF

Non Random Values (Hex)

Clear

Min DLC

0

Max DLC

8

Delay (s)

0

Start Fuzzer

Stop Fuzzer

☒ Log as BLF
 ☐ Log as CSV

Log Filename

can_data_%Y-%m-%dT%H%M%S

Start Logger

Stop Logger

CAN Reverse

BLF File

...

☒ TX Only

Delay (s)

0

Section Size

10000

Next Section

Close

Replay Section

Full Section

First Half

Second Half

Take First

Take Second

Status: No BLF File Loaded.

Send CAN Message


Arb. ID (Hex)

Clear

DLC

CAN Data (Hex)

Send




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Vulnerability in Vehicle Instrument Cluster

- The initial attack disrupted the CAN bus, causing false data on the cluster.
- It also identified a message ID linked to the digital speedometer




Security Risks on the Road

- Identified vulnerability in the Anti-lock Braking System (ABS)
- Leads to wheel lock-up during braking
- May cause loss of vehicle control (In emergency situation)



Random Attack on a vehicle

- Electronic systems were disrupted due to the attack, which occurred without prior knowledge of IDs.
- Caused blinking infotainment icons and **flickering** headlights
- Triggered autonomous **window** movements and **audible** alerts
- Led to sudden **battery** drain
- Displayed **error** notifications on the instrument cluster



Teoresi Lab Expo

CAN Fuzzer Tool: Injects and tests CAN messages in real-time.

Setup: Uses NeoVI Pi interface and STM32 dashboard display.

Functions: Supports fuzzing, manual message sending, logging, and replay.

Purpose: Facilitates automotive cybersecurity testing, reverse engineering, and vulnerability identification in vehicle communication systems.





Thank You For Your Attention